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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AMANDA HARVEY, : APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. : Case No. 970153 
960904572 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE : 
COMPANY, 
Defendant/Respondent. Priority No. 15 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
the pour-over order from the Utah Supreme Court dated May 14, 1997. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in determining that Amanda 
Harvey's right to claim underinsured motorist benefits from Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company was fixed as of the date of her 
injury on August 14, 1993? 
This is an issue of law which is reviewed for correctness 
without difference to the findings of the trial court. Utah Dept. 
of Environmental Quality v. Wind River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869 
(Utah 1994 . 
The issues were preserved in the trial court by way of 
motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opposition thereto. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW 
1. 31A-22-305(10) (6) , U.C.A. prior to amendment. 
2. 31A-22-3 05(10)(c)(i)(B), U.C.A., which became 
effective May 1, 1995. 
3 . Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 
P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 14, 1993, Amanda Harvey was a passenger in an 
automobile being driven by Kyle Schwartz. Mr. Schwartz, at the 
south gate of Hill Air Force Base, made a left turn in front of an 
on-coming jeep. The jeep collided with the Schwartz vehicle. 
Amanda Harvey was very seriously injured. 
Allstate insured Kyle Schwartz. In January, 1996, Judge 
Rodney Page approved a settlement in Amanda's favor against Mr. 
Schwartz and Allstate for $110,000 ($100,000 liability money and 
$10,000 underinsured money). The settlement documents were then 
signed with actual payment of the settlement money taking place in 
February, 1996. 
Amanda's parents and family members, including Amanda, 
were insured through Bear River Mutual Insurance Company for an 
additional $10,000 in underinsured coverage. Than money was 
demanded cf Bear River. It refused payment saying thaL because the 
2 
accident occurred before the enactment of 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B), 
Amanda was not entitled to receive this money from it. 
On March 6, 1997, Judge Frank Noel entered his order 
agreeing that Amanda was not entitled to recover underinsured 
benefits from Bear River. A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 
19, 1997. It is from this ruling that Amanda Harvey now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On August 14, 1993 Amanda Harvey was a passenger in 
an automobile driven by Kyle Schwartz. He was insured by Allstate. 
2. Amanda Harvey was seriously injured in an automobile 
accident, resulting in permanent injuries and necessitating 
extensive medical treatment. 
3. Allstate paid $100,000 to settle the liability of 
Kyle Schwartz for the claims of Amanda Harvey and $10,000 in 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
4. On January 2, 1996, Judge Rodney Page approved the 
settlement of Amanda Harvey's claim against Allstate's insured Kyle 
Schwartz. At that time, settlement documents were signed. 
5. Allstate's settlement money was actually paid out in 
February, 1996. 
6. At the time of Amanda's injury on August 14, 1993 her 
parents were insured by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company. 
7. The Harvey's insurance contract provided $10,000 in 
underinsured coverage to family members. 
3 
8. However, the Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
contract specifically excluded coverage of insurance for 
unaerinsured purposes until identified conditions precedent were 
met. 
There is no coverage until the limits of 
liability of all bodily injury liability bonds 
or policies that apply have been used up by 
payment of judgments or settlements to other 
persons. 
9. In January, 1996, those conditions precedent having 
been satisfied, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company was asked to 
pay Amanda's underinsured claims against it. It refused payment. 
10. At the time of the accident which injured Amanda in 
August, 1993, U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305(10) (6) prohibited stacking 
of underinsured coverage. 
11. On May 1, 1995, Section 31A-22-305(10) (c) (i) (B) took 
effect. It changed the law in this state to specifically permit an 
injured family member to recover underinsured benefits from the 
family policy, in addition to recovering benefits under the policy 
covering the vehicle the person occupied at the time of the 
accident. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's contract of 
insurance regarding underinsured coverage, specifically excluded 
coverage until ("There is no coverage until. . .") in this 
instance, Allstate had actually paid the judgment or settlement to 
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Amanda. Settlement and payment of Amanda's claim against Allstate 
and its insured Kyle Schwartz did not occur until January and 
February, 1996. Therefore, under the Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company's contract, until conditions precedent were met, Amanda 
had no underinsured coverage at all until January and February, 
1996, at which time the coverage and her claim was first 
established or created. Because Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company's coverage was not established or created until January or 
February, 1996, Amanda is entitled to have her right to claim this 
coverage governed by the law in existence at the time of the 
establishment or creation of her right to make her claim. Carlucci 
v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) . 
Therefore, U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) governs her 
right to make a claim. 
ARGUMENT 
In the granting of defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court reasoned that Amanda's right to make a 
claim for underinsured coverage was fixed by the date of the 
accident (August 14, 1993); U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305 (10) (c) (i) (B) 
could not be applied retroactively before May 1, 1995/ therefore, 
because Amanda's injury occurred before May 1, 1995, she could not 
recover underinsured benefits from Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company. 
The error in this reasoning is that, by contract, Amanda 
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had no underinsured coverage through Bear River, nor a right to 
claim these benefits (There is no coverage until . . .) until 
January or February, 1996, when the claim against Allstate was 
settled and paid. Therefore, there is no need to apply U.C.A., 
Section 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B) retroactively because her 
underinsured claim did not arise, was not created or established 
until January or February, 1996. 
The longstanding rule of insurance contract 
interpretation in this state is that where an insurance policy is 
ambiguous, the language of the policy-contract must be construed 
against the drafting insurance company and in favor of payment of 
benefits. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. V. Sandt, 854 
P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). Bear River argues that Amanda's right to 
claim underinsured benefits vested or matured as of the date of the 
accident, therefore, the pre-May, 1995 version of the statute 
prohibiting stacking governs. However, the policy of insurance 
does not say 'Amanda's rights to coverage vest or mature at the 
time of the accident'. To the contrary, the policy says she has 
"no coverage" until, in this instance, Allstate has actually paid 
Amanda the judgment or settlement against its insured Kyle 
Schwartz. Thus, the question of coverage under the contract 
language is subject to two differing interpretations, one of which 
permits a recovery and one which does not. Applying the Utah 
insurance rule, the interpretation in favor of coverage must be the 
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holding in the case. 
In addition, the trial court erred in ruling that 
Amanda's right to underinsurance benefits was fixed, in this 
instance, by the date of the accident. Our Supreme Court's ruling 
in Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 
(Utah 1986) mandates a holding that Amanda's claim did not arise 
until Allstate's settlement money was actually paid to her. 
In Carlucci, Lester Carlucci was killed in an industrial 
accident on October 7, 1983. He was survived by his wife and three 
children. His employer did not have worker's compensation 
insurance and was in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of his 
death. In March, 1984, some five months after Mr. Carlucci's 
death, the Default Indemnity Fund was created pursuant to U.C.A., 
Section 35-1-107. Mrs. Carlucci sought death benefits from that 
Fund. The Industrial Commission and Default Indemnity Fund had 
denied her claim saying that it arose before the creation of the 
Fund so she could not avail herself of its benefits. While stating 
the general rule that the law establishing substantive rights and 
liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently 
enacted statute governs the resolution of a dispute, the Supreme 
Court said the critical issue was whether Ms. Carlucci's claim 
arose before or after the enactment of the statute. 
It was the holding of the court that "because 
the Default Indemnity Fund is not liable until 
such tirr.e as the employer becomes unable co 
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discharge his workmen's compensation 
liability. . . Thus, a worker, or his 
dependents, in case of his death, cannot sue 
the Fund cefore it is clear that the primary 
obligor, tne employer, cannot pay. It follows 
that a dependent's right against the Indemnity 
Fund does not accrue until the primary 
obligor's inability to pay his liability is 
established. 
In other words, the right to recover does not accrue 
until the conditions precedent have been met. Applying the same 
reasoning here, it is clear from the ruling in Carlucci that Amanda 
Harvey's right to claim underinsured benefits from Bear River, by 
contract, did not accrue until the condition precedent, namely the 
payment of a judgment or settlement from Allstate to her, which 
occurred in January and February, 1996, actually took place. The 
actual payment of the settlement money in February, 1996 
establishes then the date that her right to make such a claim 
accrued (i.e. the conditions precedent were satisfied). Thus it 
follows that her claim is then governed by the law m effect at 
that time. U.C.A. Section 31A-22-305(10)(c)(l)(B) had become law 
8 months earlier. It was the law in effect at the time her right 
to claim underinsured benefits from Bear River accrued Therefore, 
it must be applied and she is entitled to claim the benefits the 
law gives her against: Bear River. 
CONCLUSION 
Amanda Harvey's claim against Bear River for underinsured 
8 
benefits did not arise until January and February, 1996. 
Therefore, she is entitled to receive underinsured benefits from 
Bear River and the trial court's ruling must be reversed. 
Dated this ^7^? day of >^^^c^t^1 , 1997 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
ppellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
lis 2>7 I hereby certify that on th: day of 
September, 1997, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to: 
Roger Bullock 
STRONG Sc HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
RECEIVED FES 2 5 19 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Stephen E. Harvey, individually, and 
as general guardian of Amanda Harvey, 
a minor, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO: 960904572 PI 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
The court reviewed defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, together with the 
memos filed in connection with the motion and rules as follows: 
The court is of the opinion the parties' rights and obligations under the insurance contract 
are fixed at a date no later than the date of the accident, and accordingly for plaintiff to prevail 
the statutory amendment would have to be applied retroactively. Under the facts of this case 
the amendment in question cannot be applied retroactively inasmuch as substantive rights of the 
parties are involved and the language of the amendment does not expressly provide for 
retroactivity. 
Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate order 
Dated this ?ll day of February, 1997. 
C-
Frank G Noel 
District Court Jud^e 
HARVEY V. BEAR RIVER PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following this
 r^?U day of February, 1997. 
James R. Hasenyager 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2408 Van Buren Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
600 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
V/IA«.<.,-..- (xy.^y'bto).. 
CARLUCCI v. UTAH STATE INDUS. COM'N 
Cite a* 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 1335 
fendants Davis and Dyer are limited part-
ners (although they are designated as gen-
era) par tners in this lawsuit). All parties 
arc residents of Utah County, and the prin-
cipal asset of the limited par tnership is real 
property located in Kane County. 
Dispute arose over the management of 
the partnership and, in February 1988, Da-
vis ami Dyer filed a complaint in Utah 
County In that action, Davis and Dyer 
sought an accounting, damages , and disso-
lution of the limited partnership. In early 
1985, Hatch filed a pro se complaint in 
Kane County. Hatch alleged that Davis 
and Dyer had wrongfully a t tempted to sell 
the Kane County property, and he sought, 
inter alia, "[a]n injunction against further 
usurpation by Defendants of the rights of 
the Plaintiff to act as the General Partner 
of [RK1 >(']." Davis and Dyer made a spe-
cial appearance to contest venue and moved 
to dismiss the action. This motion was 
ultimately granted by the district court m 
Kane County 
11.2J On appeal, Hatch points out that 
he included a quiet title cause of action in 
his lawsuit. He a rgues that under U.C.A., 
1953, § 78-13-1, he is entitled to have the 
lawsuit adjudicated in Kane County since 
that is where the property is located. The 
problem >vith Hatch's a rgumen t is that it is 
undisputed that the property is owned by 
the limited partnership KEDC, which is not 
a plaintiff in the Kane County suit.1 
Therefore, the action is not b rought by one 
who claims a legal interest in the real prop-
erty l i l ' A , 1953, § 78-40-1 . Moreover, 
tins is not a dispute over the ownership of 
the Kane County land, but a dispute be-
tween par tners over their respective rights 
and duties. Venue is therefore controlled 
by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-13-7, which provides 
generally that an action is to be tried "in 
the county in which the cause of action 
arises, or in the county in which any de-
fendant resides at O* commencement of 
the action " Since all parties to this law-
suit are residents of Utah County, the case 
should be heard there. This is particularly 
so since a similar lawsuit was already on-
going in Utah County between these same 
parties a 
The order of dismissal is therefore af-
firmed. Costs to Davis and Dyer 
I. in Ins . c p h 
agree that i nk 
biicf, Hatch slates. "We both 
rests and should rest in the 
Vickie CARLUCCI, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COM MIS-
SIGN and Defuult Indemni ty 
Fund, Defendants . 
No. 20386. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Sept. 12, 1986. 
Widow of deceased worker sought re-
view of denial of benefits from the Default 
Industrial Fund. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart , J., held that claim of worker or his 
dependents against the Fund does not arise 
until the employer's inability to pay is es-
tablished and it is the law in effect at that 
time that determines the r ights of the 
worker or his dependents 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Sta tutes «=*265, 266 
Law establishing substant ive rights 
and liabilities when cause of action arises, 
and not a subsequently enacted s ta tute , 
governs resolution of dispute. 
2. Statutes <S=>267(2) 
Statutes which are procedural only and 
do not create, alter, or destroy substantive 
rights may be applied to causes of action 
2. See Ulan R Civ 1* 13(a) loi i c q u u c m e n t s of 
filing a compulsoiy countercla im 
1 3 3 6 Utah 725 PACIFIC R E P O R T E R , 2d S K R I F S 
that have accrued or are pending at the 
time the s ta tu te is enacted. 
3. Workers' Compensation «=»(M 
Sta tu te creating the Default Indemnity 
Fund cannot apply to cases in which cause 
of action arose before effective date of 
s ta tu te . U.C.A.1953, 35-1-107. 
I. Worke r s ' Compensa t ion <£=»!057 
Worker or his dependents cannot sue 
Default Indemnity Fund before it is clear that 
primary obligor, the employer, cannot pay 
and dependents ' right against Default In-
demnity Fund does not accrue until pri-
mary obligor's inability to pay liability is 
established and it is the law in effect at 
tha t time that determines the rights of the 
workers or his dependents. U.C.A. 1953, 
35-1-107(1). 
5. W o r k e r s ' Compensa t ion <£=>64 
Widow of worker who died prior to 
effective date of act creating Default In-
demnity Fund would be entitled to compen-
sation benefits from the fund if the employ-
er did not become unable to discharge its 
workmans ' compensation liability until after 
the effective date of the Fund. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-107(1). 
Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff 
David 1. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen , Ralph L. 
Finlayson, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
In 1984, the Utah l eg i s l a tu re created the 
Default Indemnity Fund to pay workers, or 
their dependents, workmen's compensation 
benefits when their employers are unable 
to pay. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-107(1) (Repl. 
Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1985),1 which be-
came effective March 29, 1984, s ta tes that 
the Fund is 
for the purpose of paying and assuring, 
to persons entitled to, workers ' compen-
sation benefits when an employer be-
I. Section J i - I - I ( )7 was amended by the l.cgislu 
l ine effective July 1, 1986. The most significant 
i.hange in lei ins of this appeal is that the name 
of the I'und wa.s changed to "Unlimited Em 
comes insolvent, appoints or has appoint-
ed a receiver, or otherwise does not have 
sufficient funds, insurance, suret ies , or 
other security In cover worker s ' compen-
sation liabilities under this chapter If It 
becomes necessary to pay benefits, the 
fund will be liable for all obligations of 
the employer a.s set forth in Chapters 1 
and li. Title 35 
Lester Carlucci was killed in an industri-
al accident in the course of his employment 
with Pour-A-Yard, Inc. on October 7, 1983. 
He is survived by his wife, Vickie Carlucci, 
and their three children. Pour-A-Yard car-
ried no workmen's compensation insurance 
at the time of his death and was in a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding The 
case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceed-
ing February 23, 1984 
The issue on appeal is whether Mrs Car-
lucci may recover death benefits for her 
and her children from the Default Indemni-
ty Fund even though her husband died 
before the Fund was established. The In-
dustrial Commission denied her recovery 
from the Fund on the ground that the 
Indemnity Fund could not be held to apply 
to accidents occurring before the effective 
date of the s ta tute creating the fund 
Section 35-1-107 became law March 29, 
1984, some five months after Mr Carlucci 's 
death. The Commission and the Fund ar-
gue that the plaintiff's r ights are governed 
by the law in effect at the time of the 
worker 's death, when the cause of action 
arose. Mrs. Carlucci a rgues tha t since the 
s ta tu te is remedial in na ture , it should be 
construed broadly to give her a remedy. 
[1J The general rule is tha t the law 
establishing substantive r ights and liabili-
ties when a cause of action arises, and not 
a subsequently enacted s t a tu te , governs 
the resolution of the dispute. Brunyer v. 
Salt Lake County, 551 P 2d 521, 522 (Utah 
I97(i); Shape t> Wasatch Electric Co. 546 
P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 197b), Ok land Con-
pioyeis IUIHI ' H<i .ui'.t liiss ia:»e <uo.se, was 
appealed ami a igurd d in ing the t ime the I 'und 
was known ai llu Default liidcmnil> Fund, we 
use thai name in ihib opinion. 
CARLUCCI v. UTAH 
CUe u« 723 P.2d 
struction i'o t Industrial Commission, 
520 P 2 d 208, 21 (J (Utah 1974); In re An-
thony, 71 Utah 501, 504, 267 P. 789, 790 
(1928); Mercur Cold Mining & Milling Co. 
v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 229, 52 P. 382, 384 
(1898). Sec also § 68-3-3, which s ta tes : 
"No part of these revised s ta tu tes is retro-
active, unless expressly so declared." 
(2 | There are, however, exceptions to 
the rule of nonretroactivity. Sta tutes 
which are procedural only and do not cre-
ate, alter, or destroy substantive rights 
may be applied to causes of action that 
have accrued or are pending at the time the 
s ta tu te is enacted In State Department 
of Social Services e Hiygs, 656 P.2d 998, 
1000 (Utah 1 9 0 , we Mated: 
[P]roceoural s ta tu tes enacted subsequent 
to the initiation of a suit which do not 
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or 
contractual rights apph not only to fu-
ture actions, but also to accrued and 
pending ;U'UI,I..> as >vel! 
See also Pilchtt v State Department of 
Social Sen ices 663 p 2d 450, 455 (Utah 
l9S.ii /•',-/. t /. ^liiigt /, Mil P L\i 144, 151 
Utah !9',9). :", Hi, c ( 7<i/7i, 113 Utah 205, 
213-14, 192 P2d 589, 593 (1948); Industn-
il Commission i Ayee, 56 Utah 63, 67-68, 
189 P 4 14, 4 15 16 (1920), Houcojski v 
lacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 171, 104 P. 117, 119 
1909) 
[3J The s ta tu te creating the Default In-
iemmty Fund is not a procedural s ta tute , 
t establishes substantive law that creates 
L new jural entity with certain rights and 
iabihties and establishes a new cause of 
iction for workers or their dependents who 
mve been unable to collect their work-
nen's compensation benefits from employ-
e s . Being substantive in nature, the stat-
ite cannot be held to apply to this case if 
rtrs Carlucci's cause of action arose before 
he effective date of the s ta tute , and if 
here is no clear legislative indication that 
he s ta tute should apply to cases pending 
vhen it became effective Brunyer v. Salt 
Mke County, 551 P 2d ut 522; In re In-
iraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 340, 148 
>.2d 340, 341 (1944). See also Pitcher v. 
>tate Department of Social Sermces, 663 
STATE INDUS. COM'N Utah 1 3 3 7 
1335 (Utith I9H6) 
P.2d at 455. There is no evidence of such 
legislative intent. 
The critical issue, therefore, is whether 
Mrs, Carlucci's claim arose after the enact-
ment of the s tatute . Mrs. Carlucci's claim 
against Pour-A-Yard, Inc., for workmen's 
compensation death benefits is separate 
and different from the claim that her hus-
band would have had, had he lived Hall 
ing v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 
112, 118, 263 P. 78, 80 (1927). Her cause of 
action for death benefits arose, not at the 
time of her husband's accident, but at the 
time of his death, although in this case 
both occurred the same day. We have 
specifically held in the context of work-
men's compensation law that it is the law 
in force at the tune of the worker's death 
that determines a dependent's rights 
against the employer under the workmen's 
compensation laws Silver King Coalition 
Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2 
Utah 2d 1, 4, 268 P.2d 689, 691 (1954). As 
the Court suited in Silver King, "(aJ stat 
ute is not made retroactive merely because 
it draws on antecedent facts for its opera-
tion." Id. at 6, 268 P.2d at 692. See also 
Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 434, 43 S.Ct 
154, 156, 67 L.Ed. 332 (1922) It was no 
doubt this body of law that the Commission 
relied on in denying Mrs. Carlucci's claim 
against the Indemnity Fund 
(4, 5J However, Mrs. Carlucci's cause of 
action against the Indemnity Fund arose at 
some time after the date of her husband's 
death because the Default Indemnity Fund 
is not liable until such time as the employer-
becomes unable to discharge his workmen's 
compensation liability. Section 35-1-107(1) 
expressly s tates that liability arises when 
"an employer becomes insolvent, has ap-
pointed a receiver, or otherwise does not 
have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, 
or other security to cover worker's compen-
sation liabilities under this chapter." Thus, 
a worker, or his dependents, in case of his 
death, cannot sue the Fund before it is 
clear that the primary obligor, the employ-
er, cannot pay. It follows that a depend-
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ent 's right against the Indemnity Fund 
does not accrue until the primary obligor's 
inability to pay his liability is established. 
It is the law in effect at that time that 
determines Mrs. Carlucci's rights. Okland 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 520 P.2d at 210. 
The next critical question then is whether 
Mrs. Carlucci's right to a remedy under 
§ 35-1-107 accrued after that section be-
came effective. That issue has not been 
briefed by the parties to this appeal, and 
we are not in a position to resolve the issue 
given this record. For that reason we are 
obliged to remand this case to the Commis-
sion to determine when the claim arose or 
accrued. Indeed, the Commission's own 
rules governing when and how a claim may 
be made against the Fund may make a 
difference in the outcome. In any event, 
the Commission, in ruling on the point, 
should bear in mind the liberal construction 
that should be accorded the workmen's 
compensation laws, including the legisla-
tion establishing the Default Indemnity 
Fund, or what now is the Uninsured Em-
ployer's Fund 
We are aware that the Legislature did 
not appropriate any monies with which to 
fund the Indemnity Fund and that its funds 
were to be built up from unclaimed work-
er 's compensation death benefits. Accord-
ingly, a claim might be made against a 
"dry fund," as the Commission argued in 
denying relief. But that clearly was a pos-
sibility the moment the Fund came into 
existence. How such claims should be han-
dled is not before us, but may, depending 
on the Commission's ruling as to when 
Mrs. Carlucci's claim arose, become perti-
nent. The existence of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and the date of the order of dis-
charge may also be relevant to the Com-
mission's determination. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
Scott L. TI IEURER, D.M.I)., Employer 
No. I-082690- | f Plaintiff, 
BOARD O F REVIEW, INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION O F UTAH, DEPART-
MENT O F E M P L O Y M E N T SECURI-
TY, Defendant . 
No. 20903. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 12, 1986 
Newly practicing dentist brought ac-
tion appealing order o( Industrial Comrnis 
sion which held that he had acquired all or 
substantially all of asset.*, of former dentiM 
and, therefore, that wage and benefit cost 
experience of both dentists had to he con-
sidered jointly for purposes of determining 
new dentist 's unemployment compensation 
payments The Supreme Court. :;i«".'..ir!, 
J., held that newly practicing dentist'.* ac 
quisilion of 75"/< of former dentist 's assets 
did not involve "substantially all" asseLs of 
former dentist 
Reversed and remanded 
L Taxation <^3I7.1 
Provision of Employment Security Act, 
setting out when employer who purchases 
all or part of assets or business of another 
employer must make contributions to un-
employment compensation fund based in 
whole or in par t on previous employer's 
contribution rate ra ther than solely on rate 
successor employer would pay as a new 
employer, was applicable when buyer ac-
quired substantially all asseLs of business, 
rather than when buyer acquired substan-
tially all asseLs of business necessary to 
carry on principal business activities of sell-
er. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-7(c)(l)(C) 
2. Taxat ion c-».'M7.l 
"Acquire," as used in provision of Em-
ployment Security Act requiring employer 
